

The Ultimate Natural Language

— Coleridge's Idea of Living Words —

Tomohisa Hirose

Preface — Natural Language —

I. Nature and Mind

II. Mind and Language

Conclusion — The Way to the Living Words —

Preface — Natural Language —

Samuel Taylor Coleridge, known as one of the most prominent of Romantic poets by his imaginative works, was also a philosophical thinker who, with his strong sensibility, fertile imagination and keen intelligence, gave profound considerations to the problems of wide range from politics to religion. His reflection upon language was a life-long one, but it didn't take the shape of a book at last. In many fragments left by him, however, we could find that his idea of language developed in his philosophical speculation around nature and human nature.

The first of Coleridge's rather coherent comments on language can be seen in his letter to William Godwin of 1800.

I wish you to write a book on the power of words, and the processes by which human feelings form affinities with them—in short, I wish you to philosophize Horne Tooke's System, and to solve the great Questions—whether there be reason to hold, that an action bearing all the semblance of pre-designing Consciousness may yet be simply organic, and whether a series of such actions are possible—and close on the heels of this question would follow

the old 'Is Logic the Essence of Thinking?' in other words—Is thinking impossible without arbitrary signs? and—how far is the word 'arbitrary' a misnomer? Are not words etc. parts and germinations of the plant? And what is the Law of their Growth?—In something of this order I would endeavor to destroy the old antithesis of Words and Things, elevating, as it were, words into Things, and living Things too. All the nonsense of vibrations etc. you would of course dismiss.

(Collected Letters, I, pp. 625–26)

From this passage, we could, to some extent, guess the direction of his thought i.e. what he thought his ideal language should be. For him language should be, more than anything else, a living thing of nature, and in this point he seems to think of a kind of what we may call the ultimate natural language as a model of his ideal language. Language is not a set of arbitrary signs, but itself a process of nature which is united with the process of human thinking. Thus thinking, Coleridge tried to break 'the old antithesis of Words and Things,' that words arbitrarily represent things which are different in nature from words.

Of course, the idea of natural language that words and things are in natural and essential relation has existed from ancient times. And there has been two kinds of assertions in the tradition of this idea, of which one can be seen in Plato's "Cratylus" where Cratylus insists that names represent the essences of things. The other can most typically be seen in Lucretius's "De Natura" the effect of whose assertion about language is that speech is an expression of human nature. And both kinds were united in the Christian doctrine of Adamic language. According to this, Adam who was created in the image of God is gifted with reason as his nature by which he recognizes the essences of things. So when Adam gives names to things, these names not only represent the essences of things named, but also express Adam's inner nature.

Coleridge must have thought of the existence of the natural and essential relation between things and phonetic forms of words. And this must be the reason he in his own manner appreciated Horne Tooke's etymological studies, and he himself continued to study etymology all through his life. But judging from the direction of his thought on language underlying in his above quoted letter, it is improbable that he should have been contented with the examination of the relation between names and things. In his notebook of 1810 he repeats, 'Words are not mere symbols of things and thoughts, but themselves things.' And he further says,

any harmony in the things symbolized will perforce be presented to us more easily as well as with additional beauty by a correspondent harmony of the Symbols with each other.

(The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, III, #3762)

Coleridge seems to have seen this representative aspect of naturalness of language in the process where language as an organic system creatively reveals the world.

Meanwhile, for Coleridge, this process of the organic development of language itself is none other than the process of the intrinsic development of thinking i.e. that of thinking without arbitrary signs, which is at the same time the expression of the mind as human nature. Thus in Coleridge's ideal language those two kinds of naturalness must have been united, and so it may look similar to Adamic language. But he must have deepened it as his own in the development of his reflection on nature and mind.

Then is 'to philosophize Horne Tooke's System' in the direction of Coleridge's ideal language? The following quotation from "Table Talk" of his later years is the answer:

Tooke affects to explain the origin and whole philosophy of language by what is, in fact, only a mere accident of its history.

His abuse of Harris is most shallow and unfair. Harris, in the *Hermes*, was dealing—not very profoundly, it is true, —with the philosophy of language, the moral and metaphysical causes and conditions of it, etc. Horne Tooke, in writing about the formation of words only, thought he was explaining the philosophy of language, which is a very different thing.

(Table Talk, 7 May 1830)

To Coleridge what mattered was to search for and construct the model of his ideal language through the consideration, like Harris, of ‘the moral and metaphysical causes and conditions’ of language. And the outline of that model was from the first conceived as the ultimate natural language stated above, so in this direction he proceeded with his metaphysical consideration of nature and mind to lay the foundation of the model.

Thus Coleridge’s philosophy of language took the form of the presentation of his ideal language. It did so perhaps because there existed before him other views, and therefore other presentations of language which were unacceptable to him, especially one which considers words as arbitrary signs. And behind them there must have been the views of nature and mind which were also unacceptable to Coleridge, especially one which considers them as passive and mechanical. In the following chapters, the development of Coleridge’s thinking around nature, mind and language will be traced in comparison with these opposite views.

I. Nature and Mind

Coleridge’s view of nature develops around the distinction between the two Scholastic concepts of ‘*natura naturans*’ and ‘*natura naturata*.’ From the former imagined is the nature as an active process, and from the latter the nature as a passive result. Concerning these, Coleridge explains:

—in speaking the world without us as distinguished from ourselves, the aggregate of phenomena ponderable and imponderable, is called nature in the passive sense,—in the language of the old schools, *natura naturata*—while the sum or aggregate of the powers inferred as the sufficient causes of the forms (which by Aristotle and his followers were called the substantial forms) is nature in the active sense, or *natura naturans*.

(Philosophical Lectures, p. 370)

Natura naturans is that energetic aspect of nature which as the causes of forms produces phenomena. It is this nature as a productive process that is what Coleridge thought should be the reality of nature which corresponds to his ideal language. On the other hand, *natura naturata* is nothing more than the phenomenal result of this productive process.

Behind the fact that Coleridge dared to use these Scholastic terms in presenting the image of his real nature is his discontent with the view of nature which had been prevailing since the Scientific Revolution. The mechanical view of nature, which had been completed during the eighteenth century based on the Newtonian laws, was, in fact, nothing more than the extraction of the quantitative relations in phenomena, that is, the mere presentation of the result. It did not touch the cause at all, while Coleridge thought that 'the solution of Phenomena can never be derived from Phenomena' (*The Friend*, I, p. 500).

The view of nature necessarily implies the view of mind corresponding to it. The reason Coleridge could not accept the Newtonian view of nature is not merely that it did not touch the cause, but that it did not present the faculties of the mind which could penetrate into the cause. In his letter to Thomas Poole of 1801, Coleridge maintains:

Newton was a mere materialist—Mind in his system is always

passive—a lazy Looker-on on an external World. If the mind be not passive, if it be indeed made in God's Image, and that, too, in the sublimest sense—the Image of the Creator—there is ground for suspicion, that any system built on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as a system.

(Collected Letters, II, p. 709)

This criticism of Newton shows that by this time he had overcome the influence in his early years of Hartley's theory of association which applied Newtonian view to the mind and explains the working process of it in terms of the motions of matter.

This theory of Hartley's was one of the conclusions in the tradition of the empirical view of the mind. In this tradition the mind had always been supposed to be passive against the external world from which it receives ideas ready made through sensation. Such mind, it seemed to Coleridge, could only accept phenomena as they are, that is, what exist as results, and extract relations from them. Therefore it could not grasp the real cause, *natura naturans*.

Then what is the essence of Coleridge's productive nature, and what is the implication of this nature concerning the mind? As early as 1795, when he was under the influence of Hartley, he gave a series of lectures on politics and religion at Bristol, and in the first lecture he says, 'By Deity we mean a creative or at least an organizing Intelligence' (Lectures 1795, pp. 104–105). And in the fifth lecture he explains the opening passage of St. John's Gospel as follows:

St. John asserts, that in the beginning there was Intelligence, that this Intelligence was together with God, not an emanation from him, and that this Intelligence was God himself. "All things were made by it and without this Intelligence was not anything made that was made",...

(Collected Works 1, Lectures 1795: On Politics and Religion, p. 200)

And he further says:

The texts, "It was in the World and the World was made by it, and the World knew it not" and "it was made Flesh and dwelt among us" imply—that the divine Intelligence never ceased to govern the world it had created, . . .

(Loc. cit.)

To Coleridge the creative principle of the world is intelligence. And this creative intelligence continues to work in the world, that is, in us and in nature. Now we could understand that the essence of Coleridge's productive nature is nothing but this creative intelligence which derives itself from God and works in nature. And in the mind of man also works this creative intelligence as its active essence.

This view of nature and mind of Coleridge's came from the reading of Ralph Cudworth's works just before his Bristol lectures. In "The True Intellectual System of the Universe" (1678), Cudworth confuted 'all the reason and philosophy of atheism' and demonstrated 'its impossibility,' and for this coined the term 'plastic nature' which, according to him, is the mental or intellectual cause of nature. It is an energetic and productive principle which works in nature as an agent of the divine mind i.e. perfect intellect (Book I, Chapter III). And concerning its relation with human mind, Cudworth says:

The ancients made Pan, that is nature, to play upon a harp; but sense which only passively receives particular outward objects doth here, like the brute, hear nothing but mere noise and sound and clatter, but no music or harmony at all; having no active principle and anticipation within itself to comprehend it by, and correspond or vitally sympathize with it; whereas the mind of a rational and intellectual being will be ravished and enthusiastically transported in the contemplation of it and of its own ac-

cordance to this pipe of Pan, nature's intellectual music and harmony.

(Op. cit., III, p. 600, quoted in R. L. Brett, *Fancy and Imagination*, pp. 39-40)

Just after the lectures of 1795, Coleridge composed the famous poem "The Eolian Harp" in which are the following lines:

Or what if all of animated nature
Be but organic Harps diversely fram'd,
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the Soul of each, and God of all?

Nature, the essence of which is the creative intelligence derived from God, plays the intellectual music when animated, and human mind, the essence of which is also the creative intelligence derived from God, actively produces resonance with this music.

II. Mind and Language

When the mind of man, who was created in the image of God, works actively according to its creative nature, how does it form a connection with language? To know this further consideration into the workings of the mind is necessary. To Coleridge the useful means for it was the distinction in each of the two pairs of concepts, 'understanding and reason' and 'fancy and imagination.'

Mainly through Cudworth, Coleridge could overcome the influence in his youth of empiricism which considered the mind as passive, and came to think of the mind to be intrinsically active and creative. And it is in the critical philosophy of Kant, especially in his distinction between understanding and reason, that Coleridge thought he could find the ground to demonstrate this active and creative nature of the mind. Concerning the distinction, Coleridge

says in his letter to Thomas Clarkson of 1806:

What is the difference between the Reason and the Understanding? I would reply, that that Faculty of the Soul which apprehends and retains the mere notices of Experience, as for instance that such an object has a triangular figure, that it is of such or such a magnitude, of such and such a color, and consistency, with the anticipation of meeting the same under the same circumstances, in other words, all the mere *φαινόμενα* of our nature, we may call the Understanding. But all such notices, as are characterized by Universality and Necessity, as that every Triangle must in all places at all times have it's two sides greater than its third—and which are evidently not the effect of any Experience, but the condition of all Experience, and that indeed without which Experience itself would be inconceivable, we may call Reason—and this class of knowledge was called by the Ancients *Νοούμενα* in distinction from the former, or *φαινόμενα*. Reason is therefore most eminently the Revelation of an immortal soul, and it's best Synonime—it is the *forma formans*, which contains in itself the law of its own conceptions.

(Collected Letters, II, p. 1198)

What this passage shows is that Coleridge, by considering understanding the faculty of the mind which only deals with phenomena i.e. *natura naturata*, relieved reason as the faculty essential to the mind which, as *forma formans*, works actively and autonomously and causes resonance with *natura naturans*, the productive nature. Of course, understanding, part of the whole capacity of the mind which is intrinsically active, does not work merely passively.

the Understanding wherever it does not possess or use the Reason, as another and inward eye, may be defined the conception of the Sensuous, or the faculty by which we generalize and arrange the

phaenomena of perception: that faculty, the functions of which contain the rules and constitute the possibility of outward Experience.

(Collected Works 4, The Friend, I. p. 156)

With its own rules it makes experience possible. But it always stands under the phenomena of sense perception, and works under the condition of them. So it cannot break through the condition itself, and touch the real cause of nature.

Meanwhile, to the reason liberated from the meddlings with phenomena are to be given what Coleridge thought to be the essential qualities of the mind, namely, the absolute activeness and creativity. It may be said that Coleridge neo-Platonized Kant along the line of Cudworth's thought. According to Cudworth,

Knowledge is an inward active energy of the mind, not arising from things acting from without. . . . Some ideas of the mind proceed not from outward sensible objects, but arise from the inward activity of the mind itself. . . . All the ideas of things artificial have something in them that never came from sense. This true of plants and animals.

(A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, IV-i, ii)

Coleridge, in the mean time, says in "Appendix C" of "The Statesman's Manual" (1816) that 'Reason, in the highest sense of the term, as the focal point of the Theoric and Practical, or as both in One, is the Source of ideas and conversely, an idea is a self-affirming Truth at once theoric and practical, which the Reason presents to itself, as a form of itself' (p. 61, f.n.). Reason is exactly what Cudworth called 'the inward activity of the mind' which produces ideas. And human reason can only be thus productive because it derives itself from the Supreme Reason, God himself.

Then, in what way does reason work actively and productively?

In "Appendix E" of "The Statesman's Manual" Coleridge traces the stages of 'representation' or 'presentation' as 'the most general term belonging to speculative intellect' from SENSATION to AN IDEA, and says,

that which is neither a Sensation or a Perception, that which is neither individual (i.e. a sensible Intuition) nor general (i.e. a conception) which neither refers to outward Facts nor yet is abstracted from the Forms of perception contained in the Understanding; but which is an educt of the Imagination actuated by the pure Reason, to which there neither is or can be an adequate correspondent in the world of senses—this and this alone is = AN IDEA. Whether Ideas are regulative only, according to Aristotle and Kant; or likewise CONSTITUTIVE, and one with the power and Life of Nature, according to Plato, and Plotinus is the highest problem of Philosophy, and not part of its nomenclature.

(Collected Works 6, Lay Sermons, The Statesman's Manual, Appendix E, pp. 113–114)

From this passage, it may be said that when reason works actively, it works in the form of (= actuates) imagination, which produces (= educes) ideas. And this productive role of imagination is the very essence of the creativity of the mind. Concerning this, in his "Biographia Literaria" (1817) Coleridge explains:

The Imagination then, I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary Imagination I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.

(Biographia Literaria, I, p. 202)

The primary imagination engages itself in perception. And if the

object of perception is the creative process of nature, the working of imagination itself should be a creative process. So it is natural that the ideas produced by imagination in this process of perception and creation should be 'constitutive, and one with the power and life of nature, according to Plato and Plotinus.' They are living things born in the union of nature and mind.

Now it is evident that what Coleridge thought to be his ideal language, the language as an organic system, must be the form of these living ideas, and be united in one with them. 'The Word is the first Birth of the Idea, and its flexible Organ' (*The Friend*, I, p. 474, f.n.). Therefore language must be a living system developing with the workings of imagination, and must not at all be fixed. Language becomes fixed when words and things are in such relation that each individual word represents each individual existing thing, and that arbitrarily. In this state of fixedness language loses touch with the creative process of nature and mind. And it is in the intention 'to destroy the old antithesis of Words and Things' derived from this fixedness that Coleridge maintains in his letter to James Gillman, Jr. of 1826:

(as I have long ago observed to you) it is the fundamental Mistake of Grammarians and Writers on the philosophy of Grammar and Language (to assume) that words and their syntaxis are the immediate representatives of Things, or that they correspond to Things. Words correspond to Thoughts; and the legitimate Order and Connection of words to the laws of Thinking and to the acts and affections of the Thinker's mind.

(Collected Letters, VI, p. 630)

But there in the mind exists the tendency towards fixedness. In this direction works understanding. And in this direction also works 'fancy' which looks similar to imagination but is, in fact, completely different from it in nature and dignity.

Fancy, on the contrary, has no other counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The Fancy is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word Choice. But equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its material ready made from the law of association.

(*Biographia Literaria*, I, p. 202)

Thus fancy bridges sense and understanding. And if, as Coleridge suggests in his "Aids to Reflection" (1825), understanding is of the same nature as instinct and is principally concerned with the selection of means for the nearby purposes (pp. 163-164), as far as man lives physically and materially, it cannot be helped that ideas and words should get fixed in this direction. Therefore reason cannot but work on the condition of the fixed world, and it is all the more significant for this. This aspect of the working of reason is what Coleridge called the secondary imagination.

The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.

(*Biographia Literaria*, I, p. 202)

Unlike fancy and understanding which work in the direction of fixedness, this secondary imagination vitally breaks and dissolves it, and recreates ideas and brings them into a living unity. Therefore the organs of these ideas, words as an organic system, never

get fixed. Language in this form is a metaphor in itself. It is essentially metaphorical, because it never settles in fixed meanings.

Conclusion — The Way to the Living Words —

What Coleridge thought to be his ideal language, the language elevated to a living thing, was the organic form of ideas in which productive nature and reason are united. It was itself a creative process, the resonance of nature and mind the essence of both of which is the creative intelligence derived from God. So it was not the representation of the existing world, but the living process where its own development as an organic system is at the same time the creation of the world.

Then in what way can such language be realized? To answer this question Coleridge seems to have coined the term 'desynonymization.' In "Biographia Literaria" he says that 'all languages perfect themselves by a gradual process of desynonymizing words originally equivalent' (II, p. 255). And in his "Philosophical Lectures" he says that 'the whole process of human intellect is gradually to desynonymize terms' (p. 173). So 'desynonymization' must be the process where the development of language is united with that of intellect. He explains the term as follows:

by Synonymes I mean words really equivalent, both in material meaning and in the feelings or notions associated with them / all which are defects in Language; but yet such defects as permit a progress in its powers . . . and by Homoeonyme those words, falsely thought or carelessly used as Synonymes. —To make real Synonymes into Homoeonymes, is the privilege of Genius, whether poetic or philosophic, to detect the latter in the supposed former the province of the genuine Philologist—and this . . . constitutes what I have called Synonomystic, or the process of desynonymizing pseudo-synonymes, and of determining the spe-

cific mode of Homoionomy of each.

(The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, III, #3312)

From this rather paradoxical explanation, we could see that 'desynonymization' can only proceed through highly intellectual activities of individuals. Concerning this aspect of 'desynonymization,' in "Philosophical Lectures" he maintains that 'it is the business of the philosopher to desynonymize words originally equivalent, therein following and impelling the natural progress of language in civilized societies' (p.152). He also says:

There are few mental exertions more instructive, or which are capable of being rendered more entertaining, than the attempt to establish and exemplify the distinct meaning of terms, often confounded in common use, and considered as mere synonyms. Such are the words, Agreeable, Beautiful, Picturesque, Grand, Sublime: and to attach a distinct and separate sense to each of these, is a previous step of indispensable necessity to a writer, who would reason intelligibly, either to himself or to his readers, concerning the works of poetic genius, and the sources and the nature of the pleasure derived from them.

(Biographia Literaria, II, p. 226)

Such phrases in this passage as 'to establish and exemplify the distinct meaning of terms,' or 'to attach a distinct and separate sense to each of these' should not be understood in the sense that 'desynonymization' only leads to the conceptual definiteness of each word, and therefore to the inflexibility of language. We must remember that to Coleridge language should be more than anything else a living system. So from this point of view of his, it is 'synonymization' that is what brings about an inorganic state of language, that is, a juxtaposition of seeming synonyms. And this state is none other than the fixedness of language. 'Desynonymi-

zation' causes differences between inorganically juxtaposed synonyms, and, thus relating them with each other, unites them into an organic living system. So if in this process meaning of each word comes to appear distinct, it does so in relation to other words, that is, in a whole system, which means that words live as metaphors.

Such organic systematization of words is realized more than anything else in poetry. About the poet Coleridge says:

The poet, described in ideal perfection, brings the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other, according to their relative worth and dignity. He diffuses a tone and spirit of unity, that blends, and (as it were) fuses, each into each, by that synthetic and magical power, to which we have exclusively appropriated the name of imagination.

(*Biographia Literaria*, II, p. 12)

In poetry this process of the working of imagination as the 'synthetic and magical power' is exactly the process of the organic unification of words. And in the passage which follows this, concerning the power of imagination, he further says:

This power, first put in action by the will and understanding, and retained under their irremissive, though gentle and unnoticed, controul (*laxis effertur habenis*) reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation of opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; of the general, with the concrete; the idea, with the image; the individual, with the representative; the sense of novelty and freshness, with old and familiar objects; . . . and while it blends and harmonises the natural and the artificial, still subordinates art to nature; the manner to the matter; and our admiration of the poet to our sympathy with the poetry.

(*Loc. cit.*)

The 'reconciliation' here mentioned is of the same nature as 'de-synonymization' in that its process is also the organic systematization of words, but only from the opposite side.

From these all it may be concluded that the way to the living words is the process of breaking the fixed state of words and unifying them into an organic system by differentiation and reconciliation. And it is in Milton and Shakespeare that Coleridge saw the true realization of the living words.

I was wont boldly to affirm, that it would be scarcely more difficult to push a stone out from the pyramids with the bare hand, than to alter a word, or the position of a word, in Milton or Shakespeare, (in their most important works at least,) without making the author say something else, or something worse, than he does say.

(*Biographia Literaria*, I, p. 15)

This is the state of language as a living system in its extremity where there is no possibility of the replacement of synonyms. This is exactly what Coleridge thought to be his ideal language, the ultimate natural language, the ultimate metaphor.

Bibliography

- Coleridge, S. T., *The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. K. Coburn and B. Winer, Vols. 1-7, 10, 12 and 13. 1969- .
Collected Letters of S. T. Coleridge, ed. E. L. Griggs, 6 vols., 1966.
Imagination in Coleridge, ed. J. S. Hill, 1978.
The Notebooks of S. T. Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn, 3 Double vols., 1957-73.
The Portable Coleridge, ed. I. A. Richards, 1950.
Aids to Reflection (Bohn's Popular Libr.), 1913.
Biographia Literaria, ed. J. Shawcross, 2 vols., 1907.

- The Philosophical Lectures of S. T. Coleridge, ed. K. Coburn, 1949.
 Table Talk and Omnia of S. T. Coleridge, 1917.
- Cudworth, R., *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, 1678.
A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, 1731.
- Brett, R. L., *Fancy and Imagination*, 1969.
 Hamilton, P., *Coleridge's Poetics*, 1983.
 Hawkes, T., *Metaphor*, 1972.
 Kato, R., *Coleridge's Philosophy of Language*, 1981.
 Marks, E. R., *Coleridge on the Language of Verse*, 1981.
 McKusick, J. C., *Coleridge's Philosophy of Language*, 1986.
- Barfield, O., *What Coleridge Thought*, 1972.
 Barth, J. R., *The Symbolic Imagination—Coleridge and the Romantic Tradition—*, 1977.
 Beer, J., *Coleridge's Poetic Intelligence*, 1977.
 Dekker, G., *Coleridge and the Literature of Sensibility*, 1978.
 Kessler, E., *Coleridge's Metaphors of Being*, 1979.
 Levere, T. H., *Poetry Realized in Nature*, 1981.
 McFarland, T., *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition*, 1969.
 Mileur, J. P., *Vision and Revision—Coleridge's Art of Immanence—*, 1982.
 Modiano, R., *Coleridge and the Concept of Nature*, 1985.
 Swiatecks, M. J., *The Idea of the Symbol*, 1980.
 Taylor, A., *Coleridge's Defense of the Human*, 1986.
 Warnock, M., *Imagination*, 1976.