

Imagination and Expression

—Coleridge's System of Creative Intelligence—

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Preface —The Problem of Medium in Modern Thought—

It was at the beginning of the nineteenth century when the development of modern thought since Descartes and Bacon came to its height that Samuel Taylor Coleridge, an English romantic, inquired deeply into the nature of imagination with the theory of symbol of his own. In this essay I shall investigate how the reading and reconstruction of this inquiry on a certain moment of modern thought would contribute to the realization of its possibilities, and what the implication of this realization would be to the thought of our time.

The dualistic formula of 'the absolute and essential heterogeneity of the soul as intelligence and the body as matter'¹⁾ introduced by Descartes was settled at the time of Kant as that of epistemological nature of subject and object. The development of modern thought, in a way, could be considered as the sequence of the attempts to overcome this fundamental dualism of which there were two possible ways. But both ways were essentially the same in their approach which reduces one side of the formula to the other which is regarded as the more substantial element. These

attempts, which in some cases took the form of idealism and in others realism, came to their extremes in their very nature of a systematic construction in the first half of the nineteenth century. While Hegel explained the whole world of nature and history as the self-development of absolute reason, Laplace demonstrated the possibility of explaining and therefore predicting every phenomenon in the world on the basis of atomistic, mechanistic, deterministic view of nature.

There was, of course, the third possible way to get over the fundamental difficulties of dualism as a principle. It was the position whose approach is to give priority to what is mediatory, not what is substantial, which, in fact, could already be seen in Kant and Hegel who considered the mind as more functional than substantial. But it was really at the beginning of the twentieth century when the sciences in Europe fell into a critical situation that this approach came to be seen in its own significance with its essential relation to the problem of sign, and therefore expression. For example, Ferdinand de Saussure, contradicting those traditional linguistics which considered the signification of language as dependent on existing external things and ideas and therefore treated language as something secondary to them, thought it necessary to give priority to language itself, and grasped the essence of it as the system of non-substantial arbitrary signs. He rather considered things and ideas as resulting from the articulation of this system of signs, and so elucidated the mechanism of substantiation. Ernst Cassirer made it clear that at the bottom of any field of cultural activities of human beings there exists a symbolic form which organizes those activities into a system. And David Hilbert tried to formalize the fundamental conditions of valid thinking on which every science must be based as an axiomatic system which is expressed by the relations of non-significant signs. In these attempts what is considered as primary is a system of signs which is solely

relational, and therefore is non-substantial. Considering that in the heart of the traditional Western thought, especially in that of modern thought there has been a way of thinking which seeks some fundamental principle and tries to base everything on it, this finding of a system of signs as such principle could be regarded as a certain final attainment of this tradition.

Meanwhile the post-modernistic situation emerges when our activities are conditioned by the recognition that this formal system of signs is completely an arbitrary one, and is not based on any external substance such as nature or human nature, and that it cannot give basis to itself consistently in itself, while none of our meaningful activities can be realized without and outside this system. So in the post-modern world any systematic thinking loses its weight. It is the world where what is absolute is only the accidental encounters and dispersions of the systems of signs which are perpetually floating.

But it does not seem meaningless for us now to notice the fact that in the development of modern thought proper positions have always been given to what is mediatory, and to clarify the implications of those positionings. Cassirer thought the origin of Hilbert's formalistic axiomatism to be Leibnitz's idea of 'mathesis universalis' or 'characteristica universalis.'²³ Of course, the positions given to what is mediatory in the seventeenth and eighteenth century thoughts should have been quite different from those in the thoughts of this century. But to reexamine various moments found in the former will surely be to rediscover and realize the potentials buried in the development of modern thought. The problem of imagination emerges in this reexamination and it is exactly in this context that Coleridge's idea of imagination should be read and reconstructed.

I. Imagination, Mathesis, and Expression

There were concerning imagination two opposite positions in the development of modern thought since Descartes, of which one considers it as a positive element of the mind, especially in relation to the problems of cognition, existence, and creation, and the other negative. Behind this opposition lies the fundamental difference of the view of the mind between these two positions.¹⁷

In the empiricist tradition of Britain from Hobbes to Hartley, sense experience is the only source of knowledge. And in sense experience ideas are given ready made, so the only part left for the mind to play in the formation of knowledge is to accept and keep these given ideas. In this framework imagination, if it be placed between sense and intelligence as a mediatory power of the mind, cannot be anything more than a form of memory which sometimes causes errors. Therefore association is not an active power which can compose and construct ideas, but is only a passive response of the mind to the ways ideas are given.

On the basis of this empiricist view of the mind Hartley reduced ideas to the vibrations of the brain caused by the stimuli of senses, and thought it possible for any complex mental phenomenon to be explained in terms of the way senses are stimulated. Coleridge, when he began his inquiry into the nature of the mind, was attracted by the theoretical consistency of Hartley's psychology of association. But after the concentrated metaphysical speculation between 1800 and 1801, he said:

If I do not greatly delude myself, I have not only completely extricated the notions of Time, and Space; but overthrown the doctrine of Association, as taught by Hartley, and with it all the irreligious metaphysics of modern Infidels—especially, the doctrine of Necessity.

(To Thomas Poole, March 16, 1801. Collected Letters, II, p.706)

And he called Locke 'a perfect Little-ist,' and at the same time criticized Newton as 'a mere materialist,' for:

Mind in his system is always passive—a lazy Looker-on on an external world. If the mind be not passive, if it be indeed made in God's Image, and that too in the sublimest sense—the Image of the Creator—there is ground for suspicion, that any system built on the passiveness of the mind must be false, as a system.

(To Thomas Poole, March 23, 1801. Collected Letters, II, p. 709)

So now for Coleridge it was necessary to construct a system based on the activeness of the mind by which to develop his own theory of imagination. Then what moments in the development of modern thought could contribute to this process?

Cambridge Platonists' position was just the opposite of that of the empiricists concerning the mind. They were not particularly interested in imagination itself, but their influence on Coleridge was great because to them the essence of the mind was its active and creative intellectual power derived from the absolute mind, Deity, and living both in nature and in man.²¹ In his lectures given at Bristol in 1795, Coleridge tries to interpret St. John's Gospel in line with Ralph Cudworth's view of intelligence. There he defines Deity as 'a creative or at least an organizing Intelligence,'²² and explains the opening passage of the gospel as follows:

St. John asserts, that in the beginning there was Intelligence, that this Intelligence was together with God, not an emanation from him, and that this Intelligence was God himself. "All things were made by it and without this Intelligence was not anything made that was made,"...

(Collected Works 1, Lectures 1795: On Politics and Religion,

p. 200)

And further:

The text, “It was in the World and the World was made by it, and the World knew it not” and “it was made Flesh and dwelt among us” imply—that the divine Intelligence never ceased to govern the world it had created, ...

(Loc. cit.)

To Coleridge also the principle of the world is intelligence. This intelligence is first together with God as God himself, and creates everything in the world, both nature and man. And this creative intelligence continues to act in this world, that is, in nature and in men. It is through this formula in his view of the mind based on the idea of an active and creative intelligence that Coleridge could overcome the influence of Hartley’s doctrine of association, and later construct his own theory of imagination.

In the development of modern thought there was another element which could contribute positively to the idea of imagination. This element is what we may call mathesis whose structure it seems necessary to investigate in relation to Coleridge’s theory of imagination. Michel Foucault considers the position of imagination in the seventeenth and eighteenth century thought to be between the spirit and the body. According to him, such thinkers of the age as Descartes, Malebranche, and Spinoza analyzed imagination both as a power to reach the truth of mathematics, and as what causes errors in which they found the finite nature of human beings.⁴⁹

Imagination may be considered as a sign of the finiteness of human soul enclosed in the body. But when connected with mathematics, there emerges a possibility for it to mediate between the finite and the infinite. And this may be the most positive

moment that can be found in modern mathesis. From such point of view, Shiro Yamauchi of Niigata University sharply analyses Leibnitz's and Spinoza's mathesis.⁶⁾ According to Yamauchi, the effective range of mathesis is not limited to what are in the history of mathematics.

Mathesis is what mediates between the sensible (*sensibilia*) and the intelligible (*intelligibilia*). This is exactly what Leibnitz meant when he called "mathesis universalis" the logic of imagination.⁶⁾

While the object of metaphysics is what is purely intelligible, mathesis mediates between sense and intelligence as the logic of imagination. It is in this point that Yamauchi sees the problem of mathesis in one with that of expression (*expressio*).⁷⁾

The most positive moment of mathesis for the theory of imagination may be the logic of expression or representation.⁸⁾ For, as Yamauchi points out, 'it is right between the finite and the infinite where there can be no proportion or analogia that the logic of expression matters most.'⁹⁾ Arguing on Leibnitz's idea of expression, Yamauchi says:

It must be taken into serious consideration that expression is seen working between words and thoughts, and between numerals and numbers, i. e., between what is material and what is ideal. It is between *materia* and *forma*, or between body and soul where there is no identity of genus, no proportion or analogia, no possibility of mediation that expression functions.¹⁰⁾

To Leibnitz what mattered should have been the expression of the whole universe, and of God especially, in a monad. Yamauchi sees Leibnitz's solution of the problem in the introduction of the

element of power,¹¹⁾ for Leibnitz says :

... it is the nature of every substance to express the whole universe by its power of acting and being acted on, that is, by the series of its own immanent operations. It is also truly one being, otherwise it would not be a substance, but several substances. This principle of actions, or primitive active force, from which a series of various states follows, is the form of the substance.¹²⁾

Leibnitz continues,

Also evident is the nature of the perception which belongs to all forms, namely the expression of many things in one, which differs widely from expression in a mirror or in a corporeal organ, which is not truly one. ... in the mind there is found, besides the expression of objects, consciousness or reflexion ; this constitutes a certain expression or image of God himself,...¹³⁾

From these Yamauchi points out that the infinity found in a monad is not an extensional infinity, but an intensional one, the infinity of power which is found in the oneness of a monad, its relation to itself exemplified here as consciousness or reflexion.¹⁴⁾ In consciousness we can find the structure of the mind representing itself to itself 'by its power of acting and being acted on,' which is exactly 'the series of its own immanent operations.' And this will certainly be the pivotal moment in the reading and reconstruction of Coleridge's theory of imagination.

There emerges another moment in the introduction of power into the logic of expression. Yamauchi sees this in Herder's viewing of the world as the expression of divine power, or the production of immanent eternal divine operations, in which is found the formula of *expressio=emanatio=explicatio=productio*.¹⁵⁾

Behind this formula is also found the idea of powers operating organically.

Gilles Deleuze considers Spinoza's and Leibnitz's concept of expression as an anti-Cartesian reaction from very different points of view, the rediscovery of nature and its power, and the recreation of logic and ontology: a new materialism and a new formalism. According to Deleuze, the objects to which is applied the concept of expression are the Being defined as God, the ideas defined as true ones, and the individuals defined as singular essences. And these three are so mediated by expression as that God expresses himself in the world, that the true ideas express God and the world, and that the singular essences express themselves in the ideas.¹⁶⁾ Therefore:

... les trois déterminations fondamentales: être, connaître, agir ou produire, sont mesurés et systématisés, sous ce concept. Etre, connaître, agir sont les espèces de l'expression. C'est l'âge de la <raison suffisante>: les trois branches de la raison suffisante, ratio essendi, ratio cognoscendi, ratio fiendi ou agendi, trouvent dans l'expression leur racine commune.¹⁷⁾

Now it is certain that the concept of expression is in essential relation to the problems of existence, cognition, and creation (production or generation). To develop the theory of imagination on the basis of this concept of expression will surely position the theory in the framework of those most fundamental problems, which will be the way to give imagination the most positive meaning. What can we find if we read and reconstruct Coleridge's theory of imagination by the concept of expression?

II. Imagination as the Expressive Agent of Intelligence

To develop his theory of imagination extensively in the 13th

chapter of "Biographia Literaria," Coleridge devoted several of the previous chapters (except the 10th and the 11th) to the minute preparatory consideration for it which itself was to trace the evolvings of his metaphysical speculation. The 4th chapter tells us that it was through Wordsworth's poems that he felt it necessary to build up the logic of imagination distinguished from fancy. In the middle of the 1790s when he encountered those poems, Coleridge was under the influence of Hartley's theory of association, but for the understanding of them it seemed of no use to him.

In the 5th, 6th and 7th chapters Coleridge examines the theory of association historically from Aristotle to Hartley, and says that what existed in Aristotle's theory of the mind as the positive moment is lost in the theories of modern associationists. As I mentioned already, to Coleridge the mind in the empiricist theories on which they depend seems to be always passive to what are given to it from outside as sensations.

In the 8th and 9th chapters Coleridge traces the development of modern metaphysical thinking from the formula of dualism set by Descartes and the immediate attempts to overcome it to the transcendental idealism in Germany. He does not appreciate Leibnitz's doctrine of pre-established harmony, and the pantheistic element found in Spinoza, nor does he mention the names of Cambridge Platonists. But he approvingly cites Leibnitz's addition of the phrase 'praeter ipsum intellectum' to the scholastic proposition 'nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu,' thus suggesting that there should first be layed the principle of the priority of intelligence as the essential prerequisite for the construction of dynamic philosophy necessary for his theory of imagination.

On the basis of this view of intelligence he shows his deep sympathy with the philosophers of neo-Platonic tradition and such modern mystics as Jacob Behmen. Coleridge also expresses

his great indebtedness to the ideas of the contemporary German philosophers, especially Schelling's natural philosophy and transcendental idealism, but to avoid the charge of plagiarism insists that he reached the same ideas before reading Schelling's works.

Coleridge devotes the 12th chapter entirely to the metaphysical construction of his own for the next chapter. It was minutely demonstrated by Professor Engell of Harvard University that most of the sensitive statements in this chapter have their correspondent parts in Schelling's works.¹⁾ So here I shall try to search for the possibility to reconstruct his theory of the mind and imagination by reading and finding in it various moments he might have grasped before reaching Schelling. Among them the moment of mathesis and therefore that of expression or representation seem to contribute most positively to the meaningful reconstruction of Coleridge's ideas, especially concerning the problems of cognition, existence, and creation.

It may be too naive if we see Coleridge's commitment to mathesis only in his using of mathematics as the method for his philosophical construction. But following the axiomatic method of geometry he finds that the primary construction of philosophy should also be postulated, and that this method alone could make 'philosophy possible as a science,' because geometry 'supplies philosophy with the example of a primary intuition, from which every science that lay claim to evidence must take its commencement.'²⁾

By the use of this very primary intuition, Coleridge sets the postulate of philosophy as the heaven-descended KNOW THY-SELF!³⁾ which satisfies his prerequisite of the priority of intelligence. Starting from this he tries to solve the problem of cognition by overcoming the opposition of subject and object. He defines knowledge as based on the coincidence of an object with a subject.⁴⁾ And the sum of all that is merely objective, he calls nature, 'confining the term to its passive and material sense, as

comprising all the phenomena by which its existence is made known to us,' while the sum of all that is subjective, he comprehends 'in the name of the self or intelligence.' He further considers intelligence as exclusively representative, and nature as exclusively represented; the one as conscious, the other without consciousness.⁵⁾ Having set up such framework, he insists that 'the highest perfection of natural philosophy would consist in the perfect spiritualization of all the laws of nature into laws of intuition and intellect,' and that 'the phenomena (the material) must wholly disappear, and the laws alone (the formal) must remain.'⁶⁾ He concludes :

The theory of natural philosophy would then be completed, when all nature was demonstrated identical in essence with that, which in its highest known power exists in man as intelligence and self-consciousness; when the heavens and the earth shall declare not only the power of their maker, but the glory and the presence of their God, ...

(Collected Works 7, *Biographia Literaria*, I, p. 256)

Nature is represented by intelligence, but nature represented is none other than intelligence itself, which is the self-representation of intelligence. Coleridge also says, 'Only in the self-consciousness of a spirit is there the required identity of object and of representation; for herein consists the essence of a spirit, that it is self-representative.'⁷⁾ Now we can say that the problem of cognition was solved by the formula of KNOW THYSELF=self-consciousness=self-representation of intelligence. Like the case of Leibnitz's concept of expression (representation), in this formula which also shows the self-relational nature of the mind Coleridge sees the moments to mediate not only between materia and forma, but also between the finite mind and the infinite God.

In the latter half of the 12th chapter of "*Biographia Litera-*

ria," Coleridge declares his intention to construct the dynamic philosophy scientifically arranged in the third treatise of the book planned as "Logosophia," which is, according to his conviction, 'no other than the system of Pythagoras and of Plato revived and purified from impure mixtures.'⁸⁾ Then, in preparation for the development of his theory of imagination, he enumerates the basic theses of this philosophy. And here he proposes 'SUM or I AM' as the first principle. But he immediately tries to express it indiscriminately by the words spirit, self, and self-consciousness, saying, 'In this, and in this alone, object and subject, being and knowing, are identical, each involving and supposing the other. In other words, it is a subject which becomes a subject by the act of constructing itself objectively to itself; but which never is an object except for itself, and only so far as by the very same act it becomes a subject.'⁹⁾ Here presented is the problem of existence, and it is solved in the formula of I AM=self-consciousness=self-representation of intelligence in which being and knowing are identical. Intelligence becomes intelligence by the act of representing itself to itself. By this identification of the problem of cognition and that of existence Coleridge could find a philosophical way to reach the ground of existence, 'sum quia deus est,' i. e., 'I am because God is,' or 'sum quia in deo sum,' i. e., 'I am because I exist in God.'¹⁰⁾ For, where the ground of existence and the ground of the knowledge of existence are absolutely identical, we find our finite self in the great eternal I AM.¹¹⁾ So 'we begin with the I KNOW MYSELF, in order to end with the absolute I AM. We proceed from the self, in order to lose and find all self in God.'¹²⁾

All these lead directly to Coleridge's definition of what he calls the primary imagination in the 13th chapter of "Biographia Literaria":

The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power

and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.

(Collected Works 7, Biographia Literaria, I, p. 304)

Here the central matter is 'creation,' but in it is united the moments of cognition and existence. And as what mediates between the finite mind and the infinite I AM is the self-consciousness, this primary imagination is exactly the power which operates in it. Imagination is none other than the agent of the self-representation of intelligence in which the moments of cognition, existence, and creation are in one.

III. Expression and Symbol

Then, how can the action of imagination, i. e., the self-representation of intelligence in which cognition, existence, and creation are in one, be expressed in this world? What comes to matter here is the expressive power of sign. Coleridge, arguing on the expressive nature of the stories of the Bible, considers imagination as:

that reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in themselves, and consubstantial with the truths, of which they are the conductors.

(Collected Works 6, Lay Sermons, The Statesman's Manual, p. 29)

The self-representation of intelligence as the operation of imagination, therefore, is realized as the production of a system of symbols. Then what is the nature of symbol which makes

possible the expression of this process. Coleridge further says:

... a Symbol is characterized by a translucence of the Special in the individual or of the General in the Especial or of the Universal in the General. Above all by the translucence of the Eternal through and in the Temporal. It always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the representative.

(Collected Works 6, Lay Sermons, The Statesman's Manual, p. 30)

Here we can find a formula of part and whole, especially that of the organic unity and its living part, by which it is seen possible for the expressive power of symbol to emanate.

The idea of organic unity is at the core of Coleridge's view of nature and mind. The essence of nature and mind will surely be expressed by the symbols thus formulated. But what should be investigated here is the question concerning the most essential of the problems of expression. That is whether the mediation between what is finite and what is infinite is possible in this formula. Coleridge seems to try to solve this question by the introduction of mathesis. What he depends on is Pythagoras' number theory. In his "Philosophical Lectures" Coleridge says that Pythagoras thought number to be 'the best symbol, ..., of the representation of the laws of nature considered as homogeneous with the pure reason in man' (II, p. 108). He also says that what Pythagoras thought to be the reason of number being such symbol is that:

in numbers considered philosophically there was a perpetual reference to a unity that was yet infinite, and yet that in each number there was an integral or individual that still contained in its nature something progressive, that went beyond it.

(Loc. cit.)

Each number, being an individual part of the whole, can represent (refers to) the essence of the whole, a unity, though infinite, because numbers are systematically organized, and each number is an essential part of that infinite whole. The essence of an individual number is the integration of its relations with other numbers ordered progressively, and therefore is its relation to itself of progressively going beyond itself, by which it can represent the infinite whole. If imagination can produce a system of symbols of this nature, such a system will be the expression of the self-representation of intelligence in which cognition, existence, and creation are in one.

Conclusion —In Search of Symbolic Language—

Coleridge, following Pythagoras, considered numbers as an ideal system of symbols. But if his motive of constructing a theory of active and productive imagination distinguished from fancy was to throw light upon the nature of Wordsworth's poems, and to recover his own poetic inspiration, what was to be questioned should have been whether and how poetic language as a system of symbols can be realized. Coleridge proposes what he calls the secondary imagination from this practical point of view.

The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate: or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.

(Collected Works 7, *Biographia Literaria*, I, p. 304)

To Coleridge the mind fixed on objects is dead, which means that it ceases to be self-conscious or self-representative. For self-consciousness or self-representation is an continual act of the mind to view itself as the object of itself and therefore dissolve itself from objectified itself. By the primary imagination the mind perceives and creates itself as the object of itself, but for this process to continue the secondary imagination should work to dissolve the mind from the mind itself fixed as the object of itself. As for the creation of symbols the mind should always start on the condition of being surrounded by existing symbols with fixed meanings resulted from the past activities of the mind of the creation of itself as the object of itself. So in order to recreate symbols it is necessary for the secondary imagination to liberate the mind from the mind itself fixed on objects with existing symbols.

Coleridge insists that the artist must imitate the spirit of nature, that is, 'that which is within the thing, that which is active through form and figure, and discourses to us by symbols.'¹⁾ And for this he thought it necessary for the artist first to 'eloin himself from nature in order to return to her with full effect.'²⁾ For the artist must 'out of his own mind create forms according to the severe laws of intellect,' and he 'merely absents himself for a season from her, that his own spirit, which has the same ground with nature, may learn her unspoken language in its main radicals, before he approaches to her endless compositions of them.'³⁾ This is exactly to let intelligence represent itself in its infinity by spiritualizing nature with its own symbols.

In looking at objects of Nature while I am thinking, as at yonder moon dim-glimmering thro' the dewy window-pane, I seem rather to be seeking, as it were asking, a symbolical language for something within me that already and forever exists, rather than observing any thing new. Even when that

latter is the case, yet still I have always an obscure feeling as if that new phenomenon were the dim Awakening of a forgotten or hidden Truth of my inner Nature/ It is still interesting as a Word, a Symbol! It is *Λογος*, the Creator! and the Evolver!

(Collected Notebooks, II, 2546)

It is this symbolical language that can express the original truth of the universe. And it is this power of expression that it is impossible for the present-day signs to have which are being perpetually suspended in the air.

Notes

Preface

- 1) Coleridge, S. T., *Collected Works* 7, *Biographia Literaria*, I, p. 129, p. 129 n1.
- 2) Cassirer, E., *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff—Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik*, Berlin, 1910, I-III-III.

I.

- 1) Concerning the general history of the idea of imagination, see Brett, R. L., *Fancy and Imagination*, London, 1969.
- 2) Cudworth, R., *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, 1678, I-III. A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, 1731, IV-i, ii.
- 3) Coleridge, S. T., *Collected Works* 1, *Lectures 1795: On Politics and Religion*, pp. 104-5.
- 4) Foucault, M., *Les mots et les choses—Une archéologie des sciences humaines*, Éditions Gallimard, 1966, p. 84.
- 5) Yamauchi, Sh., *Spinoza and the Problem of Mathesis—In Search of the Logic of Expressio—*, in “*Gendaishisou / revue de la pensée d’aujourd’hui*,” vol. 15-10, Tokyo, 1987, pp. 82-92.
- 6) *Ibid.*, p. 82, Eng. tr. by Hirose.

- 7) *Ibid.*, pp. 82-3.
- 8) Leibnitz often uses 'l'expression' and 'la représentation' in combination. In this essay I don't touch on the subtle difference between these. Both are gradually replaced by 'la perception' in his later works.
- 9) Yamauchi, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
- 10) *Ibid.*, pp. 90-1, Eng. tr. by Hirose.
- 11) *Loc. cit.*
- 12) Leibniz, G. W., *A Specimen of Discoveries About Marvellous Secrets of a General Nature* (c. 1686), in "Philosophical Writings," ed. by G. H. R. Parkinson, Eng. tr. by Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson, London, 1973, pp. 84-85. Its original in Latin is:
- ... omnis substantiae hanc esse naturam, ut vi sua agendi aut patiendi, hoc est serie suarum operationum immanentium exprimat totum universum. Estque Ens vere unum, alioqui non erit substantia, sed substantiae plures. Atque hoc principium actionum, seu vis agendi primitiva, ex qua series statuum variorum consequitur, est substantiae forma.
- (Leibniz, G. W., *Die philosophischen Schriften*, hrsg. von C. I. Gerhardt, Berlin 1875-80. Reprint: Hildesheim 1969. Bd. VII, «abbreviation, GP. VII», pp. 316-7.)
- 13) *Ibid.*, p. 85.
- Patet etiam, quid perceptio sit, quae omnibus formis competit, nempe expressio multorum in uno, quae longe differt ab expressione in speculo vel in organo corporeo, quod vere unum non est. ... Sed in Mente praeter expressionem objectorum conscientia sive reflexio reperitur, in qua consistit expressio sive imago quaedam ipsius Dei, ...
- (GP. VII, p. 317)
- 14) Yamauchi, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
- 15) *Ibid.*, p. 90. G. Herder develops this view in his "Gott, Einige Gespräche über Spinoza's System, 1787," (*Werke* hrsg. von B. Suphan, Berlin 1876-1913. Reprint: Hildesheim 1967-68. Bd. 16)
- 16) Deleuze, G., *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*, Paris, 1968, p. 299.
- 17) *Loc. cit.*

II.

- 1) See detailed notes by Professor Engell to the 9th and 12th chapters of "Biographia Literaria," in "The Collected Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge."
- 2) Coleridge, S. T., Collected Works 7, Biographia Literaria, I, pp. 247-250.
- 3) Ibid., p. 252.
- 4) Loc. cit.
- 5) Ibid., pp. 254-5.
- 6) Ibid., p. 256.
- 7) Ibid., p. 278.
- 8) Ibid., p. 263.
- 9) Ibid., pp. 272-3.
- 10) Ibid., p. 274.
- 11) Ibid., p. 275.
- 12) Ibid., p. 283.

III.

Conclusion

- 1) Coleridge, S. T., On Poesy or Art, Biographia Literaria, II, ed. by J. Shawcross, Oxford, 1907, p. 259.
- 2) Ibid., p. 258.
- 3) Loc. cit.

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